DETERMINANTS OF INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIP GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE IN THE MOBILE NETWORK INDUSTRY.

Alhassan Alolo Akeji Abdul-Rasheed, Wenyuan Li, Abdul-Aziz Ibn Musah, Ibrahim Abdul-Fatawu

Abstract


This paper investigates boundary decisions that determine governance structures in the telecommunication industry, particularly, the inter-organizational relationship between mobile network operators and the other players in telecommunication industry in Ghana. The firms that do business with the mobile network operators  in the telecommunication industry were classed into six namely, content providers, technology providers, service managed partners, distributors or dealers of airtime and accessories, financial institutions and mobile money merchants. A sample size of 430 respondents participated in the survey. Structural Regression modelling using Amos 23.0 is applied to test the conceptual model.  The results support the predictions of the TCT logic and as well consistent with the studies of other scholars in the field of strategic management. Findings reveal that firms with greater investment or higher asset specificity pursue greater level of vertical integration. It also reveals that firms with higher transaction uncertainty pursue greater level of vertical integration. The results further reveal that positive influence of transaction uncertainty on vertical integration becomes stronger when asset specificity increases.

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